'Xiaokang' Villages Along the LAC: China’s Border Strategy

China has built 72% of its 628 Xiaokang, or "well-off villages," near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the northeastern states, of which 90% are in Arunachal Pradesh.

Chinese “Xiaokang” villages refer to those special border settlements that have been constructed or upgraded mainly along disputed border areas in the Tibet Autonomous Region. The term “Xiaokang” means “moderately prosperous” or “well-off.”

This information was given by the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Strategy), Lieutenant General Rajeev Ghai, during his address at the annual Assam Rifles-USI seminar.

These dual-use (civil–military) villages constructed in disputed areas effectively function as permanent and fortified posts, which in the long term can pose a serious challenge to India’s security and sovereignty.

These settlements help in integrating military–civilian objectives, continuous surveillance, and strengthening presence in border areas, thereby increasing pressure on India’s northeastern borders.

Xiaokang Border Defense Villages

This project was started in the year 2017 by the government of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Under this, a total of 628 villages are being developed in 21 border counties, with a government investment of about 30 billion yuan.

Although it has been presented as an initiative for the revival of rural areas, these settlements function as dual-use infrastructure. If needed, soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can be stationed here, and rapid military deployment and mobility in disputed areas can be facilitated.

The construction of these villages is supported by the China Land Border Law, 2022, which emphasizes strengthening border security and integrating border defense with socio-economic development.

Thus, this initiative acts as a “wall of villages,” which attempts to strengthen actual control and territorial claims through gray-zone strategies.

India’s Response

Vibrant Village Programme: Development of 663 villages for modernization of border villages.

Military and diplomatic talks: Corps Commander-level meetings for disengagement (troop withdrawal) since 2020.

Development by BRO: Strategic connectivity such as the Atal Tunnel.

Patrolling agreement: In October 2024, agreement was reached for disengagement and patrolling in Depsang and Demchok for the first time since 2020.

BRICS talks: In October 2024, formal talks between the top leadership of India and China after 5 years at the Russian summit.

Line of Actual Control

The Line of Actual Control (LAC), in the absence of a formal international boundary, mainly evolved based on military positions after the India–China war of 1962. This concept was first proposed in the year 1959 by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai.

Initially, India’s then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rejected it, but later India formally accepted it under the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) of 1993 with the objective of maintaining regional stability.

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is divided into three sectors— the western sector (Ladakh/Aksai Chin), where the highest tension is observed; the middle sector (Uttarakhand/Himachal Pradesh), which is comparatively the least disputed; and the eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh/Sikkim), which mainly follows the McMahon Line.

In the eastern sector, India accepts the McMahon Line determined at the Shimla Convention of 1914 as the boundary, whereas China rejects its legal validity and refers to Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet.”

A major cause of conflict is the disagreement over the length of the LAC. According to India, its length is about 3,488 km, whereas China considers it to be about 2,000 km. Due to this difference, claims overlap in gray zones in many areas.

Due to the difficult terrain of the Himalayan region and unclear demarcation, face-offs continue to occur at many places, such as Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley, Wan Valley, Pangong Tso Lake, and Tawang.